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Abstract 
Purpose: 
This paper investigates how entrepreneurs demand for external finance changed as the 
economy continued to be mired in its third and fourth years of the global financial crisis and 
whether or not external finance has become more difficult to access as the recession progressed.  
Design/methodology/approach: 
Using a large-scale survey data on over 30,000 UK SMEs between July 2011 and March 2013, 
we estimate a series of conditional probit models to empirically test the determinants of the 
supply of, and demand for external finance.  
Findings: 
Older firms and those with a higher risk rating, and a record of financial delinquency, were 
more likely to have a demand for external finance. The opposite was true for women-led 
businesses and firms with positive profits. In general finance was more readily available to 
older firms post-GFC, but banks were very unwilling to advance money to firms with a high 
risk rating or a record of any financial delinquency. It is estimated that a maximum of 42,000 
smaller firms were denied credit, which was significantly lower than the peak of 119,000 
during the financial crisis. 
Originality/value: 
This paper provides timely evidence that adds to our general understanding of what really 
happens in the market for small business financing 3-5 years into an economic downturn and 
in the early post-GFC period, from both a demand and supply perspective. This will enable us 
to consider what the potential impacts of credit rationing on the small business sector are and 
also identify areas where government action might be appropriate.  
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1. Introduction  
Four and half years into the global financial crisis (GFC), starting from September 2008, 
the induced economic recession for a duration of six quarters and contributed to a fall of 6.4% 
in GDP, and the UK economy has still not recovered to its pre-GFC level. As a reflection to 
the credit crunch, regulators across the world have imposed more stringent capital adequacy 
requirements, which lead to an increasing unwillingness to lend to the personal and business 
sector during, and even after the crisis (Armstrong et al, 2013; Fraser et al, 2015). Small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs, businesses with 0 to 249 employees) are particularly prone 
to a contraction in credit supply given their high risk exposure (Bank of England, 2011, 2013 
and 2015; Cowling et al, 2012). Even though financial institutions have recently shown an 
increased tendency to advance credit, firms without surplus cash balances were still quantity 
constrained as seen in the considerable decline in loan to value rates. Bank of England figures 
show that net monthly flows of small business lending fell from £7.4bn in 2007 to an overall 
net repayment of £3.9bn in 2009 (Bank of England, 2011), and a further net repayment of 
£2.1bn in November 2012 (Bank of England, 2013). Further, more SMEs were found to be 
discouraged from borrowing after the GFC, because of a potential mismatch between their 
perceptions on capital availability and the true supply of credit (Cowling, et al, 2016). 
Banks have been accused of not lending to SMEs by the popular press and politicians of 
all parties since 2008 and this allegation remains a common feature of media and populist ire. 
It is true that gross lending facilities granted have fallen substantially since 2007(Armstrong 
et al, 2013; Cowling et al, 2012; Lee et al, 2014), but it is also true that businesses have been 
repaying outstanding loans to reduce their future interest repayments as cash flows have been 
squeezed by extended invoice payments periods and more generally by falling demand (Crafts 
and Hughes, 2014). Overlaid on top of the current recessionary environment is the Basel III 
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capital adequacy requirements placed on banks which may limit the pool of money available 
to lend to the business sector. 
In the UK, the Business Secretary Vince Cable announced on the 24th September 2012 
the first steps in creating a Government-backed business bank, including new Government 
funding of £1 billion. It will aim to attract private sector funding so that when fully operational, 
it is predicted that the bank could support up to £10 billion of new and additional business 
lending. The Government’s aim is to build a single institution that will address long-standing, 
structural gaps in the supply of finance, and to diversify the sources of small business finance 
with greater choice of options and providers (van der Schans, 2015). It will aim to bring 
together in one place Government finance support for SMEs. The business bank will also 
control the Government’s interests in a new wholesale funding mechanism which will be 
developed to unlock institutional investment to benefit SMEs. The decision to undertake this 
level of policy intervention explicitly assumes that the case for banks unfairly rationing the 
supply of credit to smaller businesses is proven, presently SMEs only have limited sources of 
external finance other than commercial banks. But this is not as clear cut as assumed, 
particularly their assessment of the scale of the problem. For example, recent  evidence by 
Cowling et al (2016) who, using a large-scale UK data set covering the whole GFC, found that 
whilst 55.6% of the total of 30,000 discouraged borrowers (2.5% of the SME stock) would 
have probably received loans had they applied, this represents 17,000 loans. With an average 
credit facility of around £41,000 to the SME sector this equates to £701m in potential lending. 
For term loans the average loan size is around £60,000 which equates to £1.02bn. Importantly, 
84% of UK overdraft facilities to SMEs are for less than £50,000 and half for less than £10,000, 
and 78% of loans are for less than £100,000 (BDRC Continental, 2012). More generally, 
Cowling, Liu and Ledger (2012), using the same UK data set for an earlier period, found that 
in total 73,000 SMEs were refused loan requests in 2009/10. If all these loan requests that 
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were turned down were mistakes by banks (i.e they were good lending proposals and banks 
were making a Type 1 error), this would equate to around £4.4bn. But this is not likely to be 
the case and the figure can be seen as representing a maximum potential missing loan market 
if all lending propositions were put forward by good quality entrepreneurs running low risk 
businesses. This is even more important given the key finding from US work on SME 
financing by Cavalluzzo and Wolken (2005) which found that differences in credit history 
explain most of the difference in (loan) denial rates. 
But it is clear that the BBS has deliberately sought to move away from more traditional 
interventions modes, such as loan guarantees and early stage equity, which focused on 
encouraging existing private sector financial institutions to relax funding constraints, towards 
a goal of broadening the sources of funding available to smaller businesses. Indeed a large 
proportion of their capital investments have been focused on supporting innovative new forms 
of finance and financial institutions and platforms such as P2P, supply chain lending and more 
sophisticated mezzanine financing. 
With these issues in mind, it is important to understand not only how many smaller   
business are denied access to credit when applying for loans or overdraft facilities 
(commitment loans in the US), but what differentiates smaller firms who are granted loans 
from those who are refused loans. And as the economy finally climbs out of the prolonged 
economic downturn, the dynamic nature of the banking sector and capital markets makes up-
to-the minute evidence more pertinent. It is the intention of this paper to use a unique 6 wave 
longitudinal data set for the UK (by BDRC Continental), which spans the period from July 
2011 to March 2013 the 3rd and 4th years since the financial crisis in September 2008, to 
address 4 key questions with reference to some recent empirical studies: 
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 What is the current level of demand for credit from the small business sector and has 
this changed since the GFC?  
 What is the current level of supply of credit to the small business sector and has this 
changed since the GFC?  
 How many smaller firms have been denied credit and has this changed since the GFC? 
 What differentiates smaller businesses that make successful loan applications from 
those who are unsuccessful? 
In doing so, we hope to add to our general understanding of what really happens in the 
market for small business financing 3-5 years into the GFC, from both a demand and supply 
perspective. This context is particularly interesting and unique (see Fig 1) as economic 
recessions in the UK do not normally last this long (NIESR, 2012). This will enable us to 
consider what the potential impacts of credit rationing on the small business sector are and 
also identify areas where government action might be appropriate. We will also assess whether 
their plans for the ‘Business Bank’ stand up to the evidence.  
[INSERT FIG 1 HERE] 
2. SME Credit Supply and Demand During a Recessionary Environment  
The subject of financial constraints or credit rationing has been the focus of a 
considerable body of theoretical work, and the existence of credit rationing has been examined 
extensively (Berger and Udell, 1992; Cowling, 2010; Goldfeld, 1966; Jaffee, 1971; Jones-
Evans, 2015; King, 1986; Slovin and Slushka, 1983; Sofianos et al, 1990). Previous literature 
generally focuses on the supply-side of credit market and assumes that information based 
problems discourage banks from advancing as much credit as entrepreneurs with potentially 
viable investment opportunities demand even when they are willing to pay more for loans (this 
is classic Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, credit rationing). This supply-side ‘funding gap’ has been 
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excessively used to justify government intervention to increase lending, regardless of the 
creditworthiness of borrowers (Baldock and Mason, 2015; De Meza and Webb, 2000; Fraser 
et al, 2015; Jones-Evans, 2015; Nightingale et al, 2009). Whilst the UK market has seen a 
significant decline in the flow of external funding to SMEs during and in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis (Armstrong et al, 2013; Bank of England, 2011, 2013 and 2015; BIS, 2013; 
Cowling et al, 2012; Fraser et al, 2015; Lee et al, 2015), this may further limit the growth of 
the small business sector (Fraser et al, 2015).    
The neglect of demand-side constraints in small business financing has resulted in our 
fairly limited understanding on the extent of ‘true’ credit rationing (Levenson and Willard, 
2000), particularly given the evidence that small businesses have a clear pecking order of 
finance which favours debt (Hamilton and Fox, 1998), and the use of bootstrapping for 
rationed entrepreneurs (Irwin and Scott, 2010). Information asymmetry between lenders and 
borrowers may not necessarily lead to under-investment. Particularly under certain 
assumptions, the unobservable quality of entrepreneurs may indeed result in investment 
exceeding the optimal level (De Meza and Webb, 1987, 2000). On the other hand, informed 
financiers screening firms that are not commercially attractive out of the loan market may 
actually be a rational behaviour indicating an efficient market. In this sense, some firms are 
simply not ‘investment ready’ (Mason and Harrison, 2001). Conceptualising the small 
business finance problem from both supply and demand sides would produce a more systemic 
framework for developing future entrepreneurial policies. This more holistic market 
perspective would draw attention to the simultaneity problems associated with building a 
funding system of many complex component parts (Nightingale et al, 2009). The current 
economic environment and the high uncertainty and complexity inherent in it provide a unique 
context to investigate the co-ordination of supply and demand and its effect on the SME 
financing market. 
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The rest of this section reviews the key research on small business access to finance, 
based on which we formulate the main hypotheses of the paper. 
2.1. Loan Supply 
The majority of SMEs rely on internal sources such as personal savings or retained 
earnings to fund their investment and only a small proportion have tried to obtain finance from 
external sources (Cosh et al, 2009; Cowling et al, 2012; Fraser, 2005). However, the supply 
of external finance to SMEs differs fundamentally from larger firms in the sense that private 
debt and equity markets are the only markets that SMEs have access to whilst larger firms 
have access to both private and public markets. As suggested in their seminal work on small 
business finance, Berger and Udell (1998) conceptualise the supply of capital as a dynamic 
process which changes given SMEs’ needs and options, as well as the degree of information 
opacity between firms and fund suppliers. In this sense, internal funds, trade credit, and/or 
angel finance are more appropriate for seed and start-up firms with little finance need, while 
early-growth firms have more access to venture capital and bank finance, and finally private 
equity is more suitable for firms with sustained growth and the highest capital needs. However, 
a central tenet of Berger and Udell’s model is the inter-connectedness between different 
sources of finance on a size/age/information continuum and sources of funding may be 
substitutes or complements, thus creating a ‘funding escalator’ from business formation to a 
successful market exit. 
The most common source of external funding is commercial (high street) banks 
(Colombo and Grilli, 2007; de Bettignies and Brander, 2007). Yet not all SMEs that apply for 
external credit are successful (Fairlie and Robb, 2007; Levenson and Willard, 2000; Shen, 
2002; Cowling et al, 2012). This occurs for many reasons including lack of asset cover (Coco, 
2000), poor information flows giving rise to moral hazard and adverse selection issues 
(Diamond, 1984; Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984), non-viable projects, poor 
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management teams, and exogenous factors such as unfavourable economic conditions. The 
issue of ‘unfair’ credit rationing, that is not based on borrower quality (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981), has been the focus of a large volume of literature (Cowling and Mitchell, 2003; Fraser, 
2009), and has been used to justify government intervention in the form of loan guarantee 
programmes (Cowling and Clay, 1994; Cowling, 2010; Riding, 1997; Cowling and Siepel, 
2013). The counter-argument, that banks are rational and efficient processors of information, 
given their sophisticated data and information processing systems and hundreds of thousands 
of SME account histories, is made by de Meza and Southey (1996), and, in a later paper (de 
Meza, 2004) who argues that over-lending is more typical of the SME credit market. Thus, for 
firms with high levels of information opacity and the subsequent agency problems, equity is a 
more appropriate form of finance especially for high-growth, high-risk new ventures (Berger 
and Udell, 1998; Gompers and Lerner, 1999, 2001a, 2001b; Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2003, 
2004; Mason, 2009; Maier and Walker, 1987).  
Lenders in an imperfect market would adopt a wide range of criteria to bridge the 
information gap between banks and SME borrowers (see Cowling et al, 2012 for a 
comprehensive review) and as a result, they will charge higher prices (risk premiums) to 
compensate for the higher uncertainty and risk associated when investing in SMEs. These 
criteria vary from firm-level risk indicators such as size, age and performance, to entrepreneur 
characteristics, such as gender, ethnicity, education and prior experience. In particular, smaller, 
younger (start-ups) and high growth firms (Berger and Udell, 1998; Cassar, 2004; Cowling et 
al, 2012; Fraser et al, 2015; Van Caneghem and Van Campenhout, 2010), together with firms 
with relatively inexperienced, poorer educated and ethnic minority entrepreneurs (e.g. 
Blumberg, 2007; Cassar, 2004; del-Palacio et al, 2010; Fraser, 2009; Storey, 2004) are more 
likely to have difficulties in accessing external finance. Developments in information 
technology, especially online banking, have changed the physical and psychological distance 
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in the firm-bank relationship (Rao, 2004). This has facilitated, if not necessitated, the use of 
standardised means of evaluating credit applications, which may have arguably helped to 
lower the fixed costs of lending and reduce the reliance on collateral. However, recent 
evidence shows that financial delinquency measures, such as the availability of collateral and 
credit history, have again been reported as important criteria for loan approval during the crisis 
(Fraser, 2014). 
Based on the above discussion, we formulate the following hypotheses regarding SME 
loan supply: 
HS1: Higher firm-level risk (as proxied by size, age, performance, etc.) and lower 
entrepreneurial human capital (as proxied by experience, education, qualification, etc.) will 
increase the likelihood of loan rejection after the financial crisis. 
HS2: SMEs with higher credit risk (as measured by Experian credit rating and the 
availability of collateral) are more likely to have their loan application rejected. 
HS3: SMEs with higher financial delinquency (e.g. missed repayments, bounced cheques, 
etc.) are less likely to get the loan sought in the post-crisis period.  
2.2. Loan Demand 
In a perfect market, enterprise value should be independent of capital structures chosen 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958). However, the capital market is far from perfect and firms have 
varying preferences over different forms of external finance either due to tax considerations 
or information asymmetry (Myers, 2001). Since external finance is not costless, firms with 
financing needs will primarily look into internal sources of funds and only turn to external 
sources when internally generated funds cannot satisfy the firm’s capital requirement (Myers, 
1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). The pecking-order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 
1984) based on the information asymmetry between investors and firm managers argues that 
when external finance is needed, debt is preferred to equity because new equity issues, which 
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would dilute shareholders’ ownership of the firm and could be taken by potential investors as 
a signal that the existing stock is overvalued (Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Dierkens, 1991; 
Eckbo, 1986; Shyam-Sunder, 1991). Further, control aversion is particularly important for 
start-up entrepreneurial firms and the reluctance to relinquish control may affect their 
willingness to draw upon venture capital or other types of equity finance (Le Breton-Miller 
and Miller, 2013). Despite its importance, entrepreneurs’ perception on control interest is to a 
large extent ignored in SME financing literature (Mueller, 2008). However, this finance 
sequence could be reversed if instead the informational advantage is on the investor side, 
especially in the case of entrepreneurial finance (Garmaise, 2007). Overall, empirical evidence 
on the financing decision of SMEs is in favour of the pecking order and agency theories 
(Michaelas et al, 1999), and more profitable SMEs (i.e. firms with greater internal finance) 
tend to use less external finance (Chittenden et al, 1999; Cosh et al, 2009). 
HD1: More profitable SMEs are less likely to seek bank finance. 
HD2: SMEs funded on own equity and therefore with higher owner control interests are 
more likely to seek bank finance. 
The demand-side counterpart to the supply-side body of literature focuses on the small 
business financing life-cycle (Berger and Udell, 1998) and essentially relates age, size, and 
information availability to more sophisticated forms of capital alongside a continued demand 
for short and medium-term bank loans. The discussion then focuses on how entrepreneurs can 
overcome these information problems by building relationships (Bester, 1985; Behr and Gutler, 
2007; Petersen and Rajan, 1994) or, in the absence of relationships, by offering collateral as 
security against loans (Coco, 2000; Cowling, 1999; Leeth and Scott, 1989). Given the 
widespread agreement that lack of credit can restrict the ability of entrepreneurs to invest and 
that this can reduce rates of innovation, job creation and other positive economic externalities, 
it is perhaps surprising that relatively less attention has been paid to the determinants of the 
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demand for credit from the entrepreneurial sector, particularly in a recessionary environment 
when many businesses are paying off debt. This is our theoretical contribution to the credit 
rationing debate, and complements earlier work by Cressy (1995) which identified owner 
control as a key element in the decision to apply for debt finance. Other authors have noted 
that entrepreneurs are more likely to be excessively optimistic and hence over-value their own 
ability and the predicted performance of their investments (de Meza and Southey, 1996; 
Coelho and de Meza, 2012), although there is evidence that differences in perceptions about 
banks willingness to supply loans can affect entrepreneurs loan application decisions (Kwong, 
Jones-Evans, and Thompson, 2012).  
Relating to the latter issue, small businesses with potentially good investment 
opportunities can be discouraged from applying for external funding as they fear rejection – 
so called “discouraged borrowers” (Kon & Storey, 2003). Cowling et al (2016) find that 
discouraged borrowers represent 2.5% of the total UK small business population at the 
outburst of the financial crisis in 2008, whilst using a different dataset, Fraser (2014) show 
that the number almost quadrupled in 2009. Despite the difference, both studies have 
documented a significant increase in credit discouragement as compared to pre-crisis periods. 
The level of discouragement depends on entrepreneurs’ perceived likelihood of loan 
application success, as opposed to the perceived costs of applying for finance, the latter of 
which would increase monotonically with the riskiness of the firm (Cowling et al, 2013; Fraser, 
2014; Kon & Storey, 2003). This is consistent with empirical findings that smaller, younger 
and/or riskier firms are particularly likely to be discouraged (Cavalluzzo et al, 2002; Han et al, 
2009; Xiang et al, 2014). Moreover, discouragement may induce SMEs to go down a pecking 
order and rely more on internal finance given the perception of low loan approval rate (Fraser 
et al, 2015). 
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During a prolonged economic downturn, with the general tightening of credit throughout 
the financial market and falling business confidence, SMEs tend to under-estimate the true 
supply of external finance and become (mistakenly) discouraged (Fraser, 2014). The 
underestimation of the odds of successful credit application, or overestimation of loan 
application costs, is more likely to happen for firms with higher information opacity (Kon & 
Storey, 2003), unsuccessful borrowing experience and poorer firm-bank relationship (Cowling 
et al, 2013). Again, the former may be proxied by firm-level risk measures such as size, age 
and performance, and the latter by financial delinquency measures in the form of credit 
histories. Further, as credit standards became more stringent as compared to pre-GFC periods, 
a ‘rational’ SME may be reluctant to apply even if the finance is available (North et al, 2013).  
Based on the above discussion, we formulate the following hypotheses regarding small 
business loan demand: 
HD3: Higher firm-level risk (as proxied by size, age, performance, etc.) will reduce the 
likelihood of loan application after the GFC. 
HD4: Higher financial delinquency will reduce the likelihood of loan application after the 
GFC. 
3. Data and Variables  
3.1. Sample 
This section describes the data source for this study and the survey method from which 
the data is derived, followed by a discussion on both the dependent and independent variables 
used in the analysis. 
The data corresponds to six waves of the SME Finance Monitor surveys conducted by 
BDRC Continental. The first survey wave was in July 2011, with subsequent waves carried 
out in November 2011, March 2012, May 2012, November 2012, and the most recent wave in 
March 2013. In total this represents 30,183 completed surveys with SMEs. In order to qualify 
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for interview, SMEs had to meet the following criteria in addition to the quotas by size, sector, 
and region: 
 not 50%+ owned by another company 
 not run as a social enterprise or as a not for profit organisation 
 turnover of less than £25m 
 The respondent was the person in charge of managing the business’s finances. No 
changes have been made to the screening criteria in any of the waves conducted to date. 
Quotas were set overall by size of business, by number of employees. The classic B2B 
sample structure over-samples the larger SMEs compared to their natural representation in the 
SME population, in order to generate robust sub-samples of these bigger SMEs. Fewer 
interviews were conducted with 0 employee businesses to allow for these extra interviews. 
Each quarter’s sample matched the previous quarter’s results as closely as possible. Quotas 
were set overall to reflect the natural profile by sector, but with some amendments to ensure 
that a robust sub-sample was available for each sector. Thus, fewer interviews were conducted 
in Construction and Property/Business Services to allow for interviews in other sectors to be 
increased, in particular for Agriculture and Hotels. The weighting regime was initially applied 
separately to each quarter. The six were then combined and grossed to the total of 4,548,843 
SMEs, based on BIS SME data. This ensured that each individual wave is representative of all 
SMEs while the total interviews conducted are weighted to the total of all SMEs. 
Of the 5,000 interviews conducted per quarter (by CATI using the quota sampling 
method), each respondent firm is allocated a Dun & Bradstreet and Experian credit risk rating 
and this is added to the data set on a case by case basis. The weighting system is quite complex 
and includes a general weighting to reflect the actual UK SME population by size, sector and 
region. An additional size class weight is also applied, and a rim weight for region. Further a 
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start-up weighting is also calculated based on UK SME age structure statistics. In our analysis 
we use the weighted data. 
3.2. Dependent variables 
Panel A of Table 1 shows the definition of dependent variables, which capture SMEs’ 
demand for, and banks supply of, external finance in the form of term loan and overdraft1. 
Both variables are binary variables and static in nature. Demand for finance (SOUGHT) is 
defined as whether firm owners reported having sought/applied for finance for their businesses 
in the previous twelve months. Supply of finance (GOT) is defined as whether the firm 
obtained (all or part of) the finance required. On average between July 2011 and March 2013, 
17.4% of smaller firms had sought debt finance.  
3.3. Explanatory variables 
Independent variables in this study can be classified into five groups: firm characteristics, 
owner characteristics, time indicators, firm-level risk indicators and financial delinquency 
measures. As discussed in the previous section, these variables are related to the development 
stage of the firm and the degree of information opacity between the firm and its finance 
suppliers, which have been shown to be significant in explaining the supply of and demand 
for finance by prior studies. Panel B of Table 1 defines the explanatory variables by these four 
groups. 
Firm characteristics include size, legal status, sector, firm age, and performance. Firm 
size is measured by sales turnover. This is grouped into 9 bands with an upper limit of £9.99m. 
Legal status is defined by four categories including sole trader, partnership, LLP and Limited 
liability. Sector is defined as nine one-digit SIC codes. Age is defined in six categories from 
                                                          
1 Here we only consider the most two common sources of external finance for SMEs. Other types of finance, 
such as invoice financing and equity-type finance, only form a relatively small proportion of SME finance in 
total. 
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<12 months old to >15 years old. We have two measures of performance available to us. Firstly, 
we have a profit dummy variable and secondly a fast-growth variable.  
Owner characteristics or human capital measures consist of gender, (highest) formal 
educational qualification, prior business experience, and whether or not the owner holds a 
financial qualification. 
We use Experian risk classification to measure credit risk and financial delinquency 
measures include non-payment of loans, unauthorised overdraft borrowing, bouncing cheques, 
County Court Judgements, late payment of tax, and trade credit restrictions. 
We also consider additional control variables regarding the firm’s source of finance, 
business activities and possible credit support provided for finance application. Regarding the 
source of finance, we look at whether a firm has any other loans outstanding at the time of 
application or use own equity to fund the firm. Business activities concern firms’ operating 
behaviours including innovation, the development of new process and products, and the degree 
of internationalisation (whether the firm exports products overseas). The availability of 
business plans and collateral is used as a proxy for financial security or credit support for the 
firm’s application. Finally, we include the types of loan applied for (term loan versus overdraft) 
and an indicator of first-time applicants (NEWAPP) to examine the lenders’ preference on the 
products provided to SMEs in the post-GFC era. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
3.4. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables. The data 
for loan demand (SOUGHT) shows that on average over the period measured 17.4% of 
business owners had sought bank loans. The lowest level of demand was in November 2011 
when only 10.5% of firms applied for funds. This is approximately half the level recorded in 
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May 2012 when 21.0% applied for funds. In an earlier study on the finance of UK SMEs 
between 2008 and 2010, which covered the whole duration of the official recession (Cowling, 
Liu and Ledger, 2012), loan demand is found to be higher (24%), though the study was based 
on a different sample of SMEs. It is difficult to find a plausible explanation for this trend. It is 
possibly a sign that there is a lag between when the crisis hit the credit market, and when 
SMEs’ perception on credit supply adjust accordingly.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Among those requiring finance, on average 83.3% were successful in raising a loan. This 
is lower than the pre-recession figure of almost 90%, but higher than the 70% success rate 
reported for UK SMEs in the 2008-2010 period (Cowling, Liu and Ledger, 2012). Again there 
is variation over time. Here we note that the lowest success rate for loan applications was 67.5% 
in November 2011, and the highest success rate was 89.8% in March 2012. Amongst the SMEs 
that obtained the finance required, some of them only acquired part of the finance sought so 
are still subject to credit rationing to some extent. On average 6% of the firms that applied 
were only offered partial access to the finance required during the sample period. The 
dynamics on the distribution of partial rationed firms is similar to the general supply of loans. 
By excluding them from the firms that have general access to bank loans, it can be shown that 
the percentage of SMEs with full access to finance has remained relatively stable since March 
2012. Figure 2 and Figure 3 illustrates the changing dynamics of loan demand and supply 
during the sample period (between July 2011 and March 2013). Further in Appendix A of this 
paper, we report the variation of credit demand and supply across the 12 UK regions in the 
sample. 
 [INSERT FIG 2 HERE] 
 [INSERT FIG 3 HERE] 
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The two key dynamics in terms of both loan demand and loan supply are (a) that they 
rose over time as more loans were requested and a higher proportion were granted, and, (b)that 
both demand and supply became more stable and less subject to variation quarter to quarter. 
This suggests that the market is moving back onto a stable equilibrium path after the obvious 
mismatch between supply and demand for loans in the immediate aftermath, and in the first 
two years after the GFC (as identified in Cowling, Liu and Ledger, 2012). It is worth noting 
that the equivalent figures for 2007, when the UK economy was in a boom were demand at 
26.8% of SMEs and supply of loans had an 89.3% application success rate. This evidence 
poses questions about the scale of any lending shortfalls assumed by the UK Government’s 
“Business Bank” proposal, although it is too early to factor in the effects of the Basel III capital 
adequacy requirements on credit availability. 
4. Multivariate regression results 
 
Here we econometrically model the demand for and supply of external debt finance 
between July 2011 and March 2013, the third and fourth years after the latest crisis. By 
definition, the outcome of a finance application is only recorded if a firm actually sought 
finance (Cosh et al, 2009). As both of the dependent variables are by construction binary 
variables, a probit model with selection2 is used and the maximum likelihood coefficient 
estimates are shown in Table 3. We use this econometric method, to test for sample selection 
effects given the possible non-randomness of loan application decisions. We are particularly 
interested in how demand and supply changes when the economy moves deeper into a 
prolonged downturn so we are particularly interested in the time dynamics. For the 
identification to be valid, the model requires that the selection (i.e. demand) equation includes 
at least one variable that is not included in the main probit (i.e. supply) equation. Here we use 
                                                          
2 See Van de Ven and Van Pragg (1981) for an introduction of the model. 
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12 geographical region indicators as the demand-specific variables in the model as they are 
found to be significantly associated with loan demand but have no explanatory power for loan 
supply. Moreover, we analysed both the full sample of SMEs (Models 1 and 2) and a 
subsample excluding zero-employee firms (Models 3 and 4): the findings are reasonably 
similar. 
Model 1 of Table 3 is our primary regression for credit demand and supply. The 
correlation coefficient between the selection and main equations is -0.79 and is significant at 
1 per cent level, indicating the existence of selection bias and the validity of our model. 
However, the negative value implies that loan applicants have a lower chance to get the loan 
than either a random business or a non-applicant. On the one hand, it is possible that higher-
quality firms underestimate the true supply of credit during the economic downturn and thus 
choose to scale down their investment activities. On the other hand, this could be a sign of 
credit market inefficiency as loan suppliers have failed to create a self-selection mechanism 
through which lower-quality businesses are discouraged from borrowing in the first place. 
Prior performance is found to have different effects on the demand for finance. Here we find 
that profitable firms had a lower demand for finance, in line with an increased ability to self-
finance and more broadly with pecking order theories (Cosh et al, 2009), which is consistent 
with HD1. In terms of firm-level risk indicators, it can be seen that the demand for debt finance 
is increasing monotonically with firm size (measured by sales turnover) and firm age. Thus 
HD3 is also supported. At the sector level we see the highest level of demand for loans amongst 
manufacturers. Moreover, limited liability companies have lower credit demand because the 
(mandatory) disclosure (of poor performance during the GFC) discouraged them from doing 
so. 
Consistent with earlier research (Carter and Shaw, 2006; Coleman and Cohn, 2000; 
Cowling et al, 2012), female entrepreneurs are less likely to seek external finance than male 
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entrepreneurs. This suggests that risk aversion based theories might help explain why women 
appear more reluctant to borrow than men. Interestingly, loan demand approximated an 
inverted ‘U’ shape for both owners business experience and owners education, peaking 
amongst owners with 10-15 years of experience and amongst owners with school and lower 
level vocational qualifications, suggesting that less knowledgeable entrepreneurs may have 
misinterpreted market information regarding the true credit supply.  In terms of the time 
dynamics of loan demand, we observe an inverted ‘U’ shape with demand low at the start of 
the period in July 2011 and the end of the period, March 2013. The local peak in loan demand 
was in May 2012. 
Our key findings here relate to risk and financial delinquency. If more risky firms and 
firms with a track record of financial delinquency are more likely to seek loans, then it should 
not be a public policy issue if they fail to receive them. This would be behaviours consistent 
with banks acting rationally. The results show quite clearly that loan demand is increasing 
with the risk (as measured by the Experian credit rating) of a firm. In short the less 
creditworthy a firm is, the more likely they are to ask for a loan. This is a sign that SMEs with 
higher credit risks in an economic downturn may have a shifting investment focus despite the 
lack of economically viable projects in the market. The risk-shifting theory in the corporate 
finance literature (Galai and Masulis, 1976; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) argues that in the 
presence of agency costs between debtors and shareholders, higher leverage or credit risk may 
induce firms to undertake excessively riskier projects at the cost of debt investors. This 
possibly explains why SMEs with lower credit ratings actually had a higher finance demand. 
In addition, we find that firms that have unauthorised overdraft are also more likely to request 
a loan, as is the case for firms with late tax payments who have a higher probability of seeking 
a loan. In contrast, firms that are bouncing cheques (having them re-presented to the bank due 
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to insufficient funds) have a lower probability demanding a loan. Therefore, HD4 is only partly 
supported. 
Adding further controls to the model reduces the correlation between the selection and 
main equations, but it is still significant at 10% level. Firms with no loans outstanding at time 
of application prefer to remain unlevered, whilst SMEs financed using own equity are more 
likely to apply for bank finance, implying that entrepreneurs with control interests are reluctant 
to give up their controls so they prefer debt to equity finance (HD2). Businesses that introduced 
new processes are more likely to apply for finance but the odds of firms with new products 
applying for finance are on the other hand, lower. Loan demands are higher for firms with 
formal business plans, which is usually an essential prerequisite for banks to process the firms’ 
applications. 
Here we consider the supply of loans (GOT) conditional upon the firm applying in the 
first place. The first points of note are that firm-level risk indicators such as size and sector 
did not appear to play a major role in the determination of whether or not a loan application 
was granted. The latter finding contradicts the argument of Hanousek and Filer (2004) that 
credit flows to industries with the greatest profit potential. It also questions the role that firm 
size has in reducing information asymmetries, achieving economies of scale in lending, and 
reducing transactions costs (Berger and Udell, 1998; Cassar, 2004; Titman and Wessels, 1988; 
Wald, 1999). But it was also the case that there was a positive and significant effect of firm 
age on the probability of being offered a loan, having applied. The finding is in line with the 
conventional wisdom that banks are less likely to provide finance to seed or start-up firms 
given their risk, thus providing support for HS1. The results also show that fast growth firms 
are marginally less likely to secure loans which might suggest that banks prefer incremental 
(managed) growth than the risk of accelerated growth. The finding is also consistent with the 
finding of Cowling et al (2012) that banks no longer take the growth orientation of the business 
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into account in the post-GFC period. Previous profitability also had no bearing on the banks 
loan decision. But women entrepreneurs had a higher loan approval rate, despite a lower 
general demand for loans.  
Perhaps surprisingly, entrepreneurial experience and educational qualifications were not 
found to influence the banks’ loan decision but entrepreneurs with financial qualifications 
were more likely to be granted loans. The latter effect suggests that banks respond favourably 
to evidence of formal human capital which manifests itself through more sophisticated, and 
possibly realistic, financial projections in loan applications. The partial support for HS1 
suggests that the early UK recession findings that banks moved to a smaller set of key risk 
indicators including firm age when there was uncertainty in the economy (Cowling, Liu and 
Ledger, 2012) still hold over the entire and prolonged economic turmoil.  
On risk per se, the results strongly suggest that banks dislike any level of risk above the 
most minimal.  The predicted success rate for firms with a minimal risk credit rating is 97.3%, 
but for firms with above average risk this declines to 60.1%. We also find that our measures 
of financial delinquency, with the notable exception of late tax payments, all reduced the 
probability of loan requests being granted. In order of importance problems with accessing 
trade credit was the most limiting factor for banks, followed by County Court Judgements 
(CCJs), bouncing cheques, and then unauthorised overdraft facilities and missing loan 
repayments. Therefore, HS2 is fully supported. 
Some of the additional control variables are also found to be significantly associated with 
the likelihood of loan approval. Firms with no loan outstanding and thus a lower credit risk 
are more likely to get the finance required. On the other hand, firms financed using own equity 
have a lower probability of success in loan applications. This finding is generally in line with 
traditional corporate control theories, where the cost of monitoring (shareholders’ behaviours) 
is an important concern for debt investors. Interestingly, firms that export overseas during an 
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economic downturn have lower odds of successful application, probably because of the higher 
cost and therefore higher risks associated with such activities. This finding warrants an 
interesting future research topic that links SMEs recessionary business strategy with 
entrepreneurial finance. Consistent with HS3, the availability of collateral increases the chance 
of securing the needed finance. Moreover, we find that SMEs that apply for longer-term 
finance (term loans) are significantly less likely to succeed, indicating that banks have a strong 
preference towards the provision of short-term finance. Lastly, first-time applicants are 
significantly more likely to be rejected than firms applying for loan renewal, indicating that 
information asymmetry is less acute for returning borrowers. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
As a robustness check, we further differentiate loan application outcomes by dividing 
successful applicants into those that got all the finance required (fully financed) and those only 
securing part of the finance needed (partially rationed). We use multinomial logit model to 
compare the characteristics of non-applicants, fully rationed (failed), partially rationed and 
fully financed applicants, with fully financed applicants as the base category (results reported 
in Appendix B). Using multinomial logit regression ignores the obvious and significant 
conditionality between loan supply and demand, so the results should be viewed with caution. 
Our main finding here, is that there is no systematic difference between firms that got all and 
part of the finance sought. The only criterion that differentiates partially rationed firms from 
their ‘more successful’ counterparts is the degree of financial delinquency: SMEs with records 
of unauthorised overdraft and/or problems in getting trade credit are less likely to get the full 
amount of finance required. Other than that, the findings are generally in line with our main 
empirical models.   
5. Discussion 
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We find that that even in the economic downturn after the GFC the majority of firms that 
seek bank loans receive them. It is very clear that banks take any evidence of risk and financial 
delinquency very seriously and this forms a huge part of their decision to lend or not to lend 
when presented with a loan application. Stability and track record, captured in older firms, 
also gives banks a greater sense of security when deciding to lend or not. Further re-assurance 
is gained when a key member of the ownership team has a financial qualification. But it is also 
clear that high risk and/or low quality firms who seek funding are increasingly less likely to 
get loans.  
Our findings have two implications theoretically. First, given the more stringent capital 
requirement imposed by Basel III and other financial regulations, banks have become more 
cautious when making lending decisions to minimise the credit risk of the loans. On the other 
hand, it suggests that information problems between firms and financiers are still acute 
especially in an economic downturn, and banks have found themselves unable to distinguish 
high and low quality firms through the common risk indicators such as size, age or 
performance. As a result, banks can only rely on a small set of direct measures of credit risk, 
whilst ‘ignoring’ the majority of business and owner characteristics that would otherwise 
signal a viable investment. 
So where do the mismatches occur between firms seeking loans and banks supplying 
them? And is there evidence that some investment-worthy firms are not getting loans or is it 
simply that too many lower quality firms are applying for loans. The former would be evidence 
in support of the UK governments ‘Business Bank’ and the latter evidence in favour of banks 
acting rationally, and diligently, in the face of huge liquidity issues and the implementation of 
the Basel III regime in Europe. 
We do find evidence of a deterrent effect in the market as the firms and entrepreneurs 
least likely to get offered a loan do not apply in the first place. This suggests that information 
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based problems may not be as acute as assumed. But this is confounded by our evidence that 
loan demand is strongly increasing in firm risk whilst loan supply is strongly decreasing in 
firm risk. This is supportive of the de Meza and Southey (1996) over-optimism arguments. 
The evidence also points to the fact that firms with a record of financial delinquency also have 
a higher demand for loans but are also less likely to receive them, which is generally supportive 
of the argument that banks are efficient and rational processors of information, especially with 
the wider use of a more centralised/standardised and computerised loan evaluation system 
after the GFC given the cost-cutting needs for major banks. This presents an interesting 
quandary. Firstly, we could simply say that banks are being perfectly rational in denying firms 
with a bad track record of financial delinquency loans. But we could also argue that if the 
underlying quality of the firm makes it a viable investment by banks, and they are simply 
experiencing cash flow problems in the recession, then denying loans to such firms is 
exacerbating these short-term problems. 
What is also clear, as we enter the fifth year after the GFC, is that loans are more widely 
available in general, particularly when compared to earlier empirical evidence. In this sense it 
could be argued that the case for public intervention, certainly on the scale proposed by the 
UK Government for the “Business Bank”, is debatable. In terms of predicted total numbers of 
SMEs denied loans we calculate that it is around 40,000 firms currently. But if we exclude the 
very highest risk class of firms, this estimate falls to around 30,000 firms out of a total SME 
sector of 1.21m firms (Fig 4). Note that this estimate excludes single self-employed individuals 
and their firms which represent 74.53% of the total UK stock.  
 [INSERT FIG 4 HERE] 
So what are the policy implications of our research? First, this study offers further 
justification for government interventions in the financial market especially some recent 
policy initiatives. Empirical evidence in this study suggests a significant tightening of loan 
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standard given the importance of credit rating and credit history against other criteria. Also 
banks’ reluctance to provide long-term, risk capital needed for investment has certainly 
become a concern for many growth-oriented entrepreneurs wishing to recover from the 
recession. Therefore, government interventions aiming at closing the structural gaps in the 
small business capital market should go beyond the traditional focus such as bank loans or 
early-stage equity finance. It is important that credit-worthy but young firms yet to establish a 
strong credit history and thus ineligible for bank finance are offered alternative sources of 
capital. In this sense, the British Business Bank’s effort in encouraging the development of 
non-bank, innovative new forms of finance and financial institutions and platforms, is justified. 
In terms of difficulties of SMEs in accessing debt capital, (partial) credit guarantee 
schemes are the most widely used, and long-standing, public policy supporting mechanism 
worldwide (Cowling and Siepel (2013) provide a review on several international loan 
guarantee schemes) given the commonly existed credit rationing in small firm loan market 
(Cowling and Mitchell, 2003; Honaghan, 2008; Klapper et al, 2006; Riding, 1998). The 
objective of such schemes is almost unanimously to provide loan security to SMEs who would 
not otherwise be able to obtain debt finance through conventional means (Cowling and Clay, 
1995; Riding, 1998). Our findings show that the rationale for loan guarantee schemes 
continues to hold in an economic downturn, when the availability of collateral appears to be 
one of the few variables other than measures or proxies for credit risk that is important in 
lenders’ loan supply decisions. 
However, empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of loan guarantee schemes 
remains mixed (Cowling and Siepel, 2013) and it is still a major policy challenge to ensure 
that public interventions actually assist small firms, not subsidise risky firms (Astebro and 
Bernhardt, 2003; Riding, 1998). In the UK, the Small Firm Loan Guarantee (SFLG) 
programme has been the Government’s primary debt finance instrument over the past decades 
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until it was replaced by the Enterprise Finance Guarantee (EFG) programme in 2009. Recently, 
there has been a series of empirical studies that evaluate the effectiveness and performance of 
the programme (Cowling, 2007a, 2007b, 2008, 2010; Cowling and Mitchell, 2003; Cowling 
and Siepel, 2013). Generally speaking, empirical evidence suggests that the rationale for 
public intervention is justified in the sense that SFLG has allowed certain types of small firm 
borrowers to access bank funding (Cowling, 2010) and/or improved supported firms’ 
performance (Cowling and Siepel, 2013).  
Never the less, with SFLG’s primary focus on addressing the supply-side gap in the small 
business credit market, the true extent of credit rationing and thus the rationale for SFLG is 
found to be inconclusive (Cowling, 2010) and its ability to correct for capital market 
imperfections limited (Cowling and Mitchell, 2003). The EFG was introduced as a 
replacement for SFLG in order to improve the availability of capital to a wider range of 
businesses in the current economic context yet it is too early to assess the appropriateness of 
this response. The EFG was formally evaluated in 2013 (see Allinson, Robson, and Stone, 
2013), and found that deadweight was very low in absolute terms and compared to earlier 
evaluations of SFLG. This was driven by the increasingly restrictive demands for collateral 
from banks when lending. It was also the case that EFG related lending formed a much larger 
part of the firms’ total funding package than was the case previously, confirming that banks 
were also making it more difficult per se to access loans in this period. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper investigates how entrepreneurs’ demand for external debt finance changed as 
the economy continued to be mired in its third and fourth years into the GFC and whether or 
not external finance has become more difficult to access given the prolonged recovery of UK 
economy to the pre-recession peak. Using a large data set of over 30,000 UK SMEs covering 
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a two-year period immediately after the latest global financial crisis, we find an increasing 
trend for loan demand the further away from the recession. The characteristics of loan seekers 
are generally in line with previous studies, that i) smaller firms follow a pecking order in their 
financing decision-making; and ii) SMEs with lower firm-level risk and better credit history 
are more likely to apply for finance. However, we also find that higher credit risk (measured 
by Experian credit ratings) leads to higher loan demand in our sample period, providing 
support for the risk-shifting hypothesis. 
With respect to the supply of bank finance, we find that even during the economic 
turmoil, most firms that apply for finance are successful but banks have substantially tightened 
their credit standard during the period. We conclude that banks have obviously become more 
cautious when making lending decisions. This is evident as lenders have shifted away from 
informal human capital criteria (e.g. experience) towards more direct measures of credit risk 
including credit ratings and instances of financial delinquency. In addition, firm age is also 
important with older firms deemed less risky to lend to. Financial constraints are evident 
during the recession but they are not observed consistently across all periods. It is also clear 
that business cycle theories of investment and financing have a great deal of empirical support 
and traction in recessionary environments. 
This study provides further evidence and insight into small business finance in the early 
post-GFC period. Our findings have important implications on governments’ small business 
policies, especially in the context of the recently established British Business Bank by the UK 
Government. Given the exploratory nature of our study, a natural extension for future research 
is to conduct in-depth studies on the effect of a particular set of variables, for example how 
business strategies influence both credit demand and supply. Another interesting future 
research area would be to look at the access to finance for certain kinds of SMEs, such as high-
tech or innovative firms. 
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Table 1 
Variable definitions 
Panel A: Dependent variables 
Group Variable Name Definition 
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Demand for finance SOUGHT = 1 if applying finance (bank loans and overdrafts) in the past 12 months; 0 otherwise 
Supply of finance GOT = 1 if firm receive at least part of the finance applied for; 0 otherwise 
Panel B: Independent variables 
Group Variable Name Definition 
Firm-characteristics  
Size SALES_BAND 1=<£25,000, 2=£25-49,999, 3=£50,000-74, 999, 4=£75,000-99,999, 5=£100,000-
499,999, 6=£500,000-999,999, 7=£1m-1.99m, 8=£2m-4.99m, 9=£5m-9.99m 
Legal status LEGAL 1= Sole Proprietor, 2=Partnership, 3= Limited Liability Partnership, 4= Limited 
Liability 
Industry sector SECTOR 1=Primary, 2= Manufacturing, 3=Construction, 4=Wholesale/Retail, 
5=Hotels/Catering, 6=Transport & Communications, 7=Business Services, 8=Health, 
9=Other Community 
Age FIRM_AGE 1= <12 months, 2= 1-2 years, 3= 2-5 years, 4=6-9 years, 5=10-15 years, 6=>15 years 
Performance PROFIT =1 if firm broke even or made a profit 
 FAST_GROWTH =1 if firm grew by 30% or more; 0 otherwise 
Owner characteristics  
Gender WLED = 1 if firm is a women-led business; 0 otherwise 
Education ONWER_EDUC 1=None, 2=GCSE, 3= A level, 4= HNC, 5=BTEC, 6=Professional, 7=Degree, 8=Post-
graduate Degree, 9=Other 
Prior experience OWNER_EXP 1= <12 months, 2= 1-3 years, 3= 4-6 years, 4=7-9 years, 5=10-15 years, 6=>15 years 
Financial 
Qualification 
FIN_QUAL =1 if owner has a financial qualification; 0 otherwise 
Time indicators WAVE1 = 1 if July-2011 Survey; 0 otherwise 
WAVE2 = 1 if November-2011Survey; 0 otherwise 
 WAVE3 = 1 if March-2012 Survey; 0 otherwise 
 WAVE4 = 1 if May-2012 Survey; 0 otherwise 
 WAVE5 = 1 if November-2012 Survey; 0 otherwise 
 WAVE6 = 1 if March-2013 Survey; 0 otherwise 
Risk indicators  
Experian Credit Rating RISK = 1if minimal, 2 if low risk, 3 if average risk and 4 if above average risk  
Financial Delinquency  
Missed loan repayment 
Unauthorised overdraft 
facility 
Bounced cheques 
County court judgement 
Late tax 
Trade credit restrictions 
None 
FD_LR 
FD_OD 
 
FD_BC 
FD_CCJ 
 
FD_TAX 
FD_TCR 
 
FD_NONE 
= 1 if missed loan repayment; 0 otherwise 
= 1 if had unauthorised overdraft facility; 0 otherwise 
 
= 1 if bounced cheques; 0 otherwise 
= 1 if has County Court Judgement; 0 otherwise 
 
= 1 if missed tax payments; 0 otherwise 
= 1 if has trade credit restrictions; 0 otherwise 
 
= 1 if no financial delinquency; 0 otherwise 
Additional Control Variables  
Source of funds NO_OTHER_LOAN = 1 if no other outstanding loans; 0 otherwise 
 OWN_EQUITY = 1 if entrepreneur uses own equity; 0 otherwise 
Business activities INNOVATOR = 1 undertook innovation activities; 0 otherwise 
 NEW_PROCESS = 1if  introduced new or significantly improved process; 0 otherwise 
 NEW_PRODUCTS = 1 if introduced new or significantly improved products; 0 otherwise 
 EXPORTER = 1 if business export products or services overseas; 0 otherwise 
Credit support BUSINESS PLAN = 1 if has a formal written business plan; 0 otherwise 
 COLLATERAL = 1if provided security/collateral; 0 otherwise 
Loan type TERM LOAN = 1 if apply for long-term loans; 0 otherwise 
 NEWAPP = 1 if apply for finance for the first time; 0 otherwise 
Table 2 
Variable Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Dependent variables    
Group Variable Name Mean Std Dev 
Demand for finance    
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SOUGHT 0.1735 0.3787 
Supply of finance  
  GOT 0.8489 0.3582 
Panel B: Independent variables    
Group Variable Name    
Firm-characteristics   
Size SALES_BAND   
 <£25,000 0.3683  
 £25,000 - £49,999 0.2153  
 £50,000 - £74,999 0.0971  
 £75,000 - £99,999 0.0539  
 £100,000 - £499,999 0.1203  
 £500,000 - £999,999 0.0350  
 £1m - £1.99m 0.0176  
 £2m - £4.9m 0.0092  
 £5m - £9.9m 0.0034  
Legal status LEGAL   
 Sole proprietorship 0.6740  
 Partnership 0.0486  
 Limited liability partnership (LLP) 0.0149  
 Limited liability(LTD) 0.2624  
Industry sector SECTOR   
 Primary 0.0431  
 Manufacturing 0.0657  
 Construction 0.2271  
 Wholesale / retail 0.1207  
 Hotels / catering 0.0329  
 Transport & communications 0.0688  
 Business services 0.2604  
 Health 0.0615  
 Other community 0.1198  
Age FIRM_AGE   
 <12 months 0.0958  
 1-2 years 0.1051  
 2-5 years 0.2482  
 6-9 years 0.1644  
 10-15 years 0.1378  
 15+ years 0.2487  
Performance PROFIT 0.6798 0.4666 
 FAST_GROWTH 0.1249 0.3307 
Owner characteristics   
Gender WLED 0.2546 0.4357 
Education ONWER_EDUC   
 None 0.1271  
 GCSE 0.1370  
 A level 0.0799  
 HNC 0.0625  
 BTEC 0.1906  
 Professional qualification 0.1128  
 Degree 0.1395  
 Post graduate degree 0.0930  
 Other 0.0108  
Prior experience OWNER_EXP   
 <12 months 0.0549  
 1-2 years 0.1528  
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2-5 years 0.1460  
6-9 years 0.0984  
 10-15 years 0.1551  
 15+ years 0.3837  
Financial FIN_QUAL 0.3861 0.4869 
Qualification    
Time indicators WAVE1 0.1691  
 WAVE2 0.1689  
 WAVE3 0.1674  
 WAVE4 0.1678  
 WAVE5 0.1671  
 WAVE6 0.1597  
Risk indicators    
Experian Credit Rating RISK   
 Minimal 0.0451  
 Low 0.0999  
 Average 0.2693  
 Above average 0.4377  
 Not known 0.1480  
Financial Delinquency    
Missed loan repayment FD_LR 0.0152 0.1225 
Unauthorised overdraft facility FD_OD 0.0684 0.2525 
Bounced cheques FD_BC 0.0550 0.2280 
County court judgement FD_CCJ 0.0123 0.1101 
Late tax FD_TAX 0.0493 0.2165 
Trade credit restrictions FD_TCR 0.0322 0.1766 
None FD_NONE 0.8368 0.3695 
Additional Controls    
Source of funds NO_OTHER_LOAN 0.8331  
 OWN_EQUITY 0.0948  
Business activities INNOVATOR 0.4774  
 NEW_PROCESS 0.3041  
 NEW_PRODUCTS 0.2094  
 EXPORTER 0.1214  
Credit support BUSINESS PLAN 0.4248  
 COLLATERAL 0.2571  
Loan type TERM LOAN 0.2109  
 NEWAPP 0.1661  
Note: N = 30,183, except for COLLATERAL, TERMLOAN and NEWAPP (N = 7,840), where data is only 
collected for firms that applied for finance.
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Table 3 
Probit Models with Sample Selection: Credit Demand and Supply 
  
Model 1 
(Full Sample) 
Model 2 
(Full Sample) 
Model 3 
(Excluding Self-employed) 
Model 4 
(Excluding Self-emplyed) 
Independent variables GOT|SOUGHT SOUGHT GOT|SOUGHT SOUGHT GOT|SOUGHT SOUGHT GOT|SOUGHT SOUGHT 
Group Variable Name Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error 
Firm Characteristics                 
Size SALES_BAND                 
 £25,000 - £49,999 -0.062 0.080 0.154*** 0.038 0.041 0.104 0.111*** 0.042 0.078 0.1261 0.051 0.0586 0.073 0.142 0.027 0.064 
 £50,000 - £74,999 -0.227** 0.092 0.388*** 0.043 -0.094 0.116 0.293*** 0.048 -0.042 0.135 0.327*** 0.059 0.012 0.141 0.231*** 0.065 
 £75,000 - £99,999 -0.075 0.111 0.457*** 0.047 0.191 0.140 0.315*** 0.053 0.135 0.1544 0.377*** 0.061 0.322* 0.158 0.259*** 0.067 
 £100k - £499,999 -0.209** 0.088 0.590*** 0.036 -0.009 0.110 0.409*** 0.041 -0.003 0.1343 0.519*** 0.0502 0.123 0.129 0.357*** 0.056 
 £500k - £999,999 -0.130 0.100 0.498*** 0.042 0.027 0.124 0.317*** 0.047 0.07 0.1412 0.433*** 0.0547 0.170 0.141 0.281*** 0.061 
 £1m - £1.99m -0.183* 0.106 0.697*** 0.043 0.067 0.132 0.389*** 0.048 0.018 0.1518 0.625*** 0.0557 0.194 0.147 0.342*** 0.062 
 £2m - £4.9m -0.052 0.121 0.751*** 0.045 0.307** 0.154 0.451*** 0.051 0.151 0.1698 0.683*** 0.058 0.412* 0.164 0.409*** 0.065 
 £5m - £9.9m -0.104 0.143 0.747*** 0.054 0.241 0.182 0.409*** 0.061 0.101 0.1872 0.689*** 0.0648 0.344 0.189 0.377*** 0.072 
Legal  LEGAL                 
status Partnership 0.077 0.076 0.227*** 0.033 0.252*** 0.097 0.162*** 0.036 0.188** 0.0908 0.161*** 0.0376 0.309** 0.101 0.120** 0.041 
 LLP  0.468*** 0.141 -0.293*** 0.049 0.416** 0.185 -0.303*** 0.055 0.484*** 0.1532 -0.277*** 0.0539 0.403* 0.179 -0.287*** 0.060 
 LTD 0.006 0.053 -0.029 0.026 0.022 0.071 -0.090*** 0.029 0.069 0.0658 -0.077** 0.0319 0.045 0.078 -0.115** 0.035 
Industry  SECTOR                 
sector Manufacturing -0.014 0.097 -0.365*** 0.041 0.016 0.127 -0.303*** 0.046 -0.084 0.1253 -0.422*** 0.046 -0.016 0.139 -0.365*** 0.052 
 Construction 0.089 0.088 -0.410*** 0.037 -0.068 0.116 -0.318*** 0.041 0.051 0.1171 -0.466*** 0.0435 -0.071 0.133 -0.385*** 0.048 
 Wholesale / retail 0.183* 0.099 -0.301*** 0.040 0.167 0.127 -0.246*** 0.045 0.095 0.1259 -0.364*** 0.0464 0.085 0.143 -0.303*** 0.051 
 Hotels / catering -0.149 0.100 -0.396*** 0.042 -0.223* 0.127 -0.339*** 0.047 -0.19 0.1298 -0.448*** 0.0478 -0.218 0.138 -0.386*** 0.053 
 Transport & com -0.062 0.097 -0.303*** 0.042 -0.143 0.125 -0.252*** 0.046 -0.162 0.1264 -0.333*** 0.0488 -0.214 0.140 -0.291*** 0.054 
 Business services 0.053 0.089 -0.345*** 0.037 0.029 0.117 -0.333*** 0.041 -0.039 0.1155 -0.358*** 0.0427 -0.107 0.132 -0.361*** 0.047 
 Health 0.061 0.105 -0.326*** 0.043 0.065 0.135 -0.323*** 0.048 -0.044 0.1303 -0.346*** 0.0488 -0.031 0.146 -0.332*** 0.054 
 Other community 0.032 0.099 -0.434*** 0.040 -0.002 0.130 -0.436*** 0.045 -0.018 0.1275 -0.485*** 0.0454 -0.011 0.140 -0.464*** 0.050 
Age FIRM_AGE                 
 1-2 years 0.027 0.111 0.057 0.065 0.024 0.144 0.058 0.074 -0.106 0.1606 0.217** 0.088 -0.134 0.181 0.171 0.099 
 2-5 years 0.400*** 0.122 0.066 0.059 0.420*** 0.149 0.126* 0.067 0.312* 0.1745 0.231*** 0.0794 0.202 0.180 0.229* 0.090 
 6-9 years 0.574*** 0.136 0.174*** 0.060 0.615*** 0.165 0.243*** 0.068 0.516*** 0.1939 0.321*** 0.0806 0.399* 0.191 0.349*** 0.091 
 10-15 years 0.560*** 0.140 0.235*** 0.060 0.591*** 0.169 0.322*** 0.068 0.470** 0.199 0.402*** 0.0802 0.331 0.193 0.436*** 0.090 
 15+ years 0.568*** 0.138 0.238*** 0.059 0.585*** 0.168 0.328*** 0.067 0.548*** 0.1983 0.371*** 0.0787 0.405* 0.193 0.411*** 0.089 
Performance PROFIT 0.019 0.018 0.070*** 0.008 0.178*** 0.056 0.005 0.022 0.102* 0.0543 0.066*** 0.0226 0.185** 0.061 0.039 0.025 
 FAST_GROWTH -0.098* 0.054 0.043 0.025 -0.030 0.071 0.019 0.028 -0.094 0.0629 0.018 0.028 -0.005 0.075 -0.000 0.031 
Owner Characteristics                 
Gender WLED 0.095** 0.046 -0.046*** 0.020 0.079 0.061 -0.063*** 0.023 0.082 0.0533 -0.023 0.0227 0.056 0.063 -0.056* 0.025 
Education ONWER_EDUC                 
 GCSE -0.132* 0.074 0.254*** 0.034 -0.084 0.097 0.219*** 0.038 -0.082 0.0913 0.274*** 0.0399 -0.032 0.103 0.233*** 0.044 
 A level 0.032 0.093 0.226*** 0.040 0.165 0.123 0.155*** 0.044 0.043 0.1113 0.273*** 0.0451 0.127 0.126 0.173*** 0.050 
 HNC -0.245*** 0.088 0.231*** 0.043 -0.192* 0.117 0.129*** 0.048 -0.263** 0.105 0.322*** 0.0494 -0.196 0.123 0.167** 0.055 
 BTEC -0.176** 0.074 0.193*** 0.035 -0.161 0.098 0.150*** 0.039 -0.157* 0.0944 0.256*** 0.0429 -0.134 0.109 0.196*** 0.047 
 Professional -0.186** 0.077 0.210*** 0.035 -0.171 0.103 0.170*** 0.039 -0.11 0.0946 0.263*** 0.0393 -0.079 0.111 0.201*** 0.044 
 Degree -0.106 0.076 0.169*** 0.034 -0.013 0.102 0.112*** 0.038 -0.08 0.0917 0.212*** 0.039 0.008 0.107 0.139** 0.044 
 Postgraduate -0.063 0.087 0.103*** 0.038 0.017 0.116 0.067 0.043 -0.017 0.103 0.144*** 0.0429 0.093 0.122 0.092 0.048 
 Other -0.073 0.219 0.348*** 0.099 0.016 0.269 0.205* 0.113 0.022 0.2683 0.452*** 0.1177 0.164 0.298 0.274* 0.132 
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Prior  OWNER_EXP                 
experience 1-2 years -0.119 0.154 0.177** 0.082 -0.123 0.205 0.230** 0.095 -0.041 0.2682 0.309** 0.1223 0.143 0.310 0.413** 0.140 
 2-5 years -0.046 0.157 0.170** 0.082 -0.084 0.208 0.207** 0.094 -0.047 0.2652 0.334*** 0.12 0.122 0.305 0.393** 0.138 
 6-9 years -0.210 0.160 0.162** 0.084 -0.242 0.213 0.193** 0.096 -0.251 0.2634 0.347*** 0.1208 -0.088 0.308 0.410** 0.139 
 10-15 years -0.142 0.155 0.254*** 0.080 -0.114 0.206 0.270*** 0.093 -0.193 0.2596 0.423*** 0.1176 0.026 0.300 0.462*** 0.135 
 15+ years 0.006 0.154 0.213*** 0.079 -0.001 0.205 0.259*** 0.091 -0.035 0.2606 0.396*** 0.1163 0.129 0.299 0.454*** 0.134 
 FIN_QUAL 0.096*** 0.044 0.002 0.019 0.151*** 0.057 -0.048** 0.021 0.106** 0.0514 -0.011 0.0213 0.131* 0.060 -0.055* 0.024 
Time Indicators                 
 WAVE2 0.010 0.063 -0.143*** 0.030 -0.013 0.083 -0.122*** 0.035 0.021 0.074 -0.138*** 0.0327 0.014 0.085 -0.116** 0.038 
 WAVE3 0.144** 0.073 0.310*** 0.028 0.059 0.100 0.548*** 0.032 0.176** 0.0896 0.291*** 0.0317 0.040 0.096 0.507*** 0.036 
 WAVE4 0.195*** 0.076 0.336*** 0.028 0.170 0.108 0.582*** 0.032 0.211** 0.0944 0.326*** 0.0316 0.077 0.100 0.560*** 0.036 
 WAVE5 0.032 0.067 0.301*** 0.028 -0.088 0.094 0.521*** 0.032 0.038 0.0811 0.278*** 0.0319 -0.137 0.090 0.479*** 0.036 
 WAVE6 0.163** 0.071 -0.017 0.034 -0.045 0.097 0.263*** 0.039 0.255*** 0.0907 -0.148*** 0.0406 0.020 0.107 0.152*** 0.046 
Risk Indicators                 
Experian  RISK                 
Credit 
Rating 
Low -0.201** 0.084 0.232*** 0.029 -0.181 0.111 0.188*** 0.032 -0.169* 0.0907 0.254*** 0.0302 -0.141 0.109 0.201*** 0.034 
Average -0.273*** 0.082 0.327*** 0.028 -0.223** 0.109 0.258*** 0.032 -0.230** 0.0901 0.374*** 0.0305 -0.187 0.107 0.289*** 0.034 
 Above average -0.383*** 0.083 0.357*** 0.031 -0.331*** 0.111 0.265*** 0.035 -0.364*** 0.0913 0.413*** 0.0339 -0.326** 0.109 0.305*** 0.038 
 Not known -0.382*** 0.095 0.316*** 0.038 -0.356*** 0.126 0.257*** 0.043 -0.312*** 0.1105 0.349*** 0.0448 -0.236 0.132 0.274*** 0.050 
Financial Delinquency                 
 FD_LR -0.187* 0.105 0.062 0.070 -0.154 0.131 0.027 0.077 -0.073 0.1343 -0.018 0.0835 -0.046 0.151 -0.046 0.090 
 FD_OD -0.172*** 0.066 0.345*** 0.039 -0.134* 0.082 0.271*** 0.043 -0.160** 0.0807 0.347*** 0.0439 -0.126 0.086 0.256*** 0.048 
 FD_BC -0.213*** 0.068 -0.092** 0.040 -0.289*** 0.084 -0.109** 0.044 -0.250*** 0.0854 -0.148*** 0.0448 -0.285** 0.090 -0.158** 0.049 
 FD_CCJ -0.369*** 0.113 -0.064 0.071 -0.370*** 0.140 -0.141* 0.079 -0.429*** 0.1398 -0.104 0.0798 -0.360* 0.149 -0.208* 0.089 
 FD_TAX -0.019 0.065 0.114*** 0.040 -0.009 0.082 0.047 0.044 -0.036 0.0751 0.112** 0.0438 -0.044 0.086 0.059 0.048 
 FD_TCR -0.501*** 0.076 0.007 0.045 -0.529*** 0.096 -0.090* 0.050 -0.488*** 0.0931 -0.044 0.0499 -0.461*** 0.102 -0.135* 0.055 
 FD_NONE 0.343*** 0.067 -0.284*** 0.040 0.292*** 0.086 -0.180*** 0.044 0.295*** 0.0803 -0.300*** 0.0449 0.253** 0.092 -0.178*** 0.049 
Additional Control Variables               
Source of  NOOTHERLOAN     0.911*** 0.219 -1.694*** 0.023     0.984*** 0.180 -1.620*** 0.025 
funds OWN_EQUITY     -0.344*** 0.076 0.316*** 0.030     -0.328*** 0.074 0.331*** 0.031 
Business INNOVATOR     -0.128 0.154 0.046 0.055     -0.174 0.158 0.027 0.061 
activities NEW_PROCESS     -0.042 0.142 0.108** 0.051     0.141 0.145 0.113* 0.056 
 NEWPRODUCTS     -0.068 0.074 -0.061** 0.028     -0.100 0.077 -0.048 0.031 
 EXPORTER     -0.277*** 0.083 -0.025 0.031     -0.236*** 0.087 -0.028 0.033 
Credit BUSINESS PLAN     -0.057 0.054 0.142*** 0.020     -0.006 0.063 0.129*** 0.023 
support COLLATERAL     1.535*** 0.128       1.452*** 0.137   
Loan type TERM LOAN     -0.661*** 0.060       -0.684*** 0.069   
 NEWAPP     -0.994*** 0.073       -0.910*** 0.089   
Regression Diagnostics                 
 N Obs 30,183    30,160    22,460    22,438    
 Censored 23,043    23,025    16,561    16,544    
 Uncensored 7,140    7135    5,899    5,894    
 Wald χ2 (64) 599.45    1,270.37    410.24    1016.90    
 Prob >χ2 0.00001    0.00001    0.00001    0.00001    
  -0.793    -0.492    -0.697    -0.685    
 2 ( 7.620    2.890    4.640    6.750    
 Prob >χ2 0.006    0.089    0.031    0.009    
* p .10; ** p .05; *** p .01. Asymptotic robust standard errors reported.
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Appendix 
Multinomial Logit Regression: Loan Application Outcomes  
(Base category = fully financed applicants) 
  Non-Applicants Partial Rationing Full Rationing 
Independent variables (N = 23,043) (N = 237) (N = 716) 
Group Variable Name Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error 
Firm-characteristics     
  
Size SALES_BAND     
  
 <£25,000     
  
 £25,000 - £49,999 -0.016 0.135 0.355 0.372 -0.108 0.195 
 £50,000 - £74,999 -0.604*** 0.142 0.288 0.381 -0.185 0.205 
 £75,000 - £99,999 -0.540*** 0.153 -0.060 0.440 -0.581** 0.246 
 £100,000 - £499,999 -0.770*** 0.120 0.145 0.336 -0.536*** 0.182 
 £500,000 - £999,999 -0.867*** 0.135 0.307 0.372 -0.588*** 0.219 
 £1m - £1.99m -0.849*** 0.138 0.041 0.387 -0.874*** 0.232 
 £2m - £4.9m -1.059*** 0.144 -0.038 0.406 -1.315*** 0.270 
 £5m - £9.9m -0.984*** 0.165 0.075 0.450 -1.383*** 0.333 
Legal status LEGAL       
 Sole proprietorship       
 Partnership -0.422*** 0.098 -0.409 0.283 -0.523*** 0.178 
 LLP 0.142 0.148 -0.702 0.506 -0.904*** 0.355 
 Limited liability(LTD) 0.183** 0.082 0.144 0.216 -0.037 0.133 
Industry sector SECTOR       
 Primary       
 Manufacturing 0.866*** 0.123 -0.581 0.379 0.494** 0.229 
 Construction 0.859*** 0.110 0.203 0.298 0.695*** 0.200 
 Wholesale / retail 0.531*** 0.117 -0.055 0.326 0.015 0.235 
 Hotels / catering 0.809*** 0.126 0.544* 0.318 1.039*** 0.218 
 Trans. & com. 0.754*** 0.125 0.135 0.341 0.856*** 0.218 
 Business services 0.864*** 0.108 0.132 0.299 0.508** 0.206 
 Health 0.657*** 0.126 0.087 0.352 0.414** 0.247 
 Other community 0.827*** 0.118 0.068 0.329 0.537** 0.225 
Age FIRM_AGE       
 <12 months       
 1-2 years 0.069 0.213 0.119 0.537 -0.025 0.253 
 2-5 years 0.150 0.190 0.317 0.485 -0.588** 0.239 
 6-9 years -0.088 0.193 0.184 0.493 -1.193*** 0.255 
 10-15 years -0.281 0.192 -0.282 0.500 -1.270*** 0.254 
 15+ years -0.278 0.188 -0.186 0.489 -1.280*** 0.246 
Performance PROFIT -0.096 0.061 -0.087 0.158 -0.319*** 0.100 
 FAST_GROWTH -0.045 0.077 -0.064 0.199 0.133 0.133 
Owner characteristics       
Gender WLED 0.138** 0.062 0.083 0.161 -0.176 0.111 
Education ONWER_EDUC       
 None       
 GCSE -0.508*** 0.105 0.069 0.294 -0.132 0.177 
 A level -0.348*** 0.120 -0.295 0.344 -0.595*** 0.219 
 HNC -0.435*** 0.129 -0.160 0.359 -0.102 0.211 
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 BTEC -0.128 0.113 0.443 0.292 0.142 0.180 
 Professional qualification -0.325*** 0.106 0.035 0.295 -0.009 0.186 
 Degree -0.213** 0.106 -0.283 0.304 -0.284 0.185 
 Post graduate degree -0.136 0.118 0.359 0.306 -0.204 0.213 
 Other -0.838*** 0.281 0.510 0.587 -0.492 0.501 
Prior experience OWNER_EXP       
 <12 months       
 1-2 years -0.352 0.269 -0.269 0.642 0.021 0.342 
 2-5 years -0.307 0.265 -0.273 0.630 -0.184 0.346 
 6-9 years -0.295 0.268 -0.870 0.660 0.123 0.353 
 10-15 years -0.387 0.257 -0.374 0.618 -0.095 0.335 
 15+ years -0.355 0.254 -0.617 0.610 -0.369 0.330 
Financial FIN_QUAL 0.065 0.058 0.245 0.152 -0.240** 0.105 
Qualification        
Time indicators WAVE1       
 WAVE2 0.236*** 0.079 0.063 0.229 0.226 0.142 
 WAVE3 0.185** 0.084 0.444** 0.225 0.118 0.157 
 WAVE4 0.031 0.082 0.252 0.220 -0.144 0.153 
 WAVE5 0.221*** 0.083 0.339 0.224 0.367*** 0.144 
 WAVE6 0.662*** 0.110 0.499* 0.295 0.697*** 0.175 
Risk indicators        
Experian Credit Rating RISK       
 Minimal       
 Low -0.255*** 0.083 0.268 0.271 0.216 0.223 
 Average -0.286*** 0.083 0.195 0.269 0.324 0.213 
 Above average -0.251*** 0.092 0.485* 0.277 0.506** 0.216 
 Not known -0.129 0.120 0.444 0.349 0.717*** 0.244 
Financial Delinquency       
Missed loan repayment FD_LR 0.175 0.217 -0.132 0.440 0.308 0.244 
Unauthorised overdraft  FD_OD -0.302*** 0.117 0.545*** 0.217 0.092 0.145 
Bounced cheques FD_BC 0.398*** 0.121 0.288 0.232 0.713*** 0.148 
County court judgement FD_CCJ 0.561** 0.232 -0.418 0.549 1.009*** 0.252 
Late tax FD_TAX -0.221* 0.118 0.155 0.219 -0.175 0.149 
Trade credit restrictions FD_TCR 0.479*** 0.141 1.006*** 0.238 1.343*** 0.161 
None FD_NONE 0.188 0.121 -0.275 0.244 -0.417*** 0.158 
Additional Control Variables       
Source of funds NO_OTHER_LOAN 3.930*** 0.053 0.230 0.162 0.093 0.106 
 
OWN_EQUITY -0.653*** 0.076 0.314* 0.168 0.238** 0.121 
Business activities INNOVATOR 0.040 0.150 -0.025 0.356 0.066 0.258 
 
NEW_PROCESS -0.310** 0.138 -0.287 0.315 0.001 0.235 
 NEW_PRODUCTS 0.092 0.074 0.505*** 0.189 0.185 0.124 
 EXPORTER 0.124 0.080 0.025 0.218 0.541*** 0.139 
Credit support BUSINESS PLAN -0.275*** 0.055 0.083 0.150 0.045 0.098 
Regression Diagnostics      
  
 N Obs 30,183    
  
 Log likelihood -8,609.464    
  
 Pseudo R2 0.4234    
  
 Wald χ2 (64) 12,644.57    
  
* p .10; ** p .05; *** p .01. Asymptotic robust standard errors reported. 
 
